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In their review “Enhancing Credibility of 
Chemical Safety Studies: Emerging Consensus 
on Key Assessment Criteria”, Conrad and 
Becker (2011) proposed the application of 
10 criteria to individual studies as a means 
of assessing a study’s “credibility.” They 
characterized the 10 criteria as an “emerging 
consensus” and “encouraging convergence” 
that can solve “this problem of legitimacy in 
chemical evaluation … regardless of its fund-
ing source.” Conrad and Becker explicitly 
excluded funding by industry as a criterion 
for evaluating studies, labeling funding-based 
criteria as “unscientific”; they also dismissed 
outright consideration of developing poten-
tially unbiased, third-party mechanisms for 
chemical safety testing as “too costly and 
complicated.” We agree with Conrad and 
Becker that there is an urgent unmet need 
to address the problem of conflict of interest 
in the science that under  lies the regulation 
of chemicals used in commerce. However, 
Conrad and Becker’s 10 criteria fall short of 
what is needed in several critical ways.
Conrad and Becker (2011) mischarac-
terized the problem as one of “perception” 
and “public confidence” when there is 
empirical evidence of bias related to funding 
source. Chemical manufacturing represented 
a 700 billion dollar industry in the United 
States in 2007 (U.S. Census Bureau 2007); 
thus, the chemical industry is not a disinter-
ested party in the science that informs chemi-
cal safety. In the clinical sciences, a robust 
association has been documented between 
funding from an industry that has a financial 
interest in the result, investigator conflicts 
of interest, and biased outcomes in human 
health research. For example, speaking on the 
issue of scien  tific integrity, the current Deputy 
Editor (West) of JAMA recently observed that 
“the biggest threat to integrity [is] financial 
conflict of interest” (Rennie 2010). Specific 
examples can be found in research related 
to the health effects of tobacco (Barnes and 
Bero 1997, 1998) and the safety and efficacy 
of pharma  ceuti  cals (Bero et al. 2007; Lexchin 
et al. 2003) and medical procedures (Popelut 
et al. 2010; Shah et al. 2005). These and other 
empirical findings (Bero 1999) demon  strate 
that an industry’s financial stake is unlikely to 
be mitigated by applying a 10-point “credibil-
ity score” such as the one proposed by Conrad 
and Becker. 
Conrad and Becker (2011) presented 
no evidence to support the capacity of a 
“credibility score” to reduce industry fund-
ing bias. As noted in the 2009 Institute 
of Medicine (IOM) report on Conflicts of 
Interest in Medical Research, Education and 
Practice (Institute of Medicine 2009), stud-
ies on the effects of industry relationships 
in non  clinical research, as well as studies of 
the consequences of conflict of interest poli-
cies in non  clinical research, are needed to 
establish an evidence base for future policy. 
The IOM report made no recom  menda  tions 
for managing conflicts of interest in animal 
or laboratory research because of the lack of 
empirical data. This data gap should be filled 
with credible, empirically based research 
such as what has been used to evaluate these 
questions in the clinical sciences. We (L.A.B. 
and T.W.) are currently engaged in such 
research. 
Individually and together, Conrad and 
Becker’s 10 criteria do not have the capac-
ity to mitigate funding bias. Their criteria 
are a mixture of minimal meas  ures of scien-
tific integrity (full disclosure, independence 
of principal investigators, prohibiting ghost 
writing, peer review); strongly contested 
judgments related to the superiority of study 
designs [Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) 
versus non-GLP studies]; and practices that 
lack the capacity to reduce bias unless they 
are wedded to mechanisms for transparent, 
unconflicted enforcement and accountability 
(registries and organizational existence of 
an external review policy). Although their 
scoring system admirably requires disclosure, 
their criteria standards explicitly ignored 
what is disclosed as a potential source of 
bias when evaluating the quality of a study. 
Moreover, disclosure does not itself elimi-
nate bias (Bero 1999).
There is an inherent conflict in the source 
documents from which Conrad and Becker 
(2011) drew their “consensus” criteria, with 
two of them funded directly by industry 
sources (Henry and Conrad 2008; Rowe 
et al. 2009). Henry and Conrad (2008) were 
funded by the American Chemistry Council, 
and Rowe et. al.’s paper on financial con-
flicts and scientific integrity in nutrition 
research (Rowe et al. 2009) was supported 
by the International Life Sciences Institute 
(ILSI) North America. ILSI’s programs are 
supported primarily through ILSI North 
America industry membership; the nutri-
tion paper was also specifically supported 
by Cadbury Adams USA LLC, Coca-Cola 
Company, ConAgra Foods Inc., General 
Mills, Kraft Foods, Mars Snackfoods US 
LLC, PepsiCo Inc., Proctor and Gamble, 
Sara Lee, and Tate and Lyle. 
It is significant to note that the three 
source documents not directly funded by 
industry [Bipartisan Policy Center 2009; 
Brockway and Furcht 2006; International 
Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) 
2008] (although the coauthors may include 
industry representatives) explicitly recognized 
the problem of funding as a source of bias. 
For example, while recognizing that stud-
ies should not be excluded a priori due to 
funding source, the Bipartisan Policy Center 
report states that 
Agencies and scientific advisory committees 
should consider sources of funding and any con-
flicts of interest as they review the reasons why 
a study may have been undertaken, the way a 
study was framed and carried out, and how the 
study results have been interpreted and discussed. 
(Bipartisan Policy Center 2009) 
IARC (2008) precludes research funding 
from commissioning parties that “develop 
activities or sustain principles that are con-
trary to IARC missions, e.g., the tobacco 
industry”; and FASEB (the Federation of 
American Societies for Experimental Biology) 
lists as a guiding principle that “investigators 
shall regard all significant financial interests in 
research regarding human subjects as poten-
tially problematic and thus requiring close 
scrutiny”(Brockway and Furcht 2006). A 
closer read of the source documents is incon-
sistent with Conrad and Becker’s attribution 
of an “emerging consensus” on this issue.
We are not suggesting that industry-
funded science should a priori be excluded 
from the evidence informing chemical policy. 
We are proposing that based on the evidence 
from the clinical sciences, an important path-
way to addressing funding bias is through 
the application of systema  tic and transparent 
methodologies to vet the science, includ-
ing explicit recognition of the potential bias 
introduced by funding source (Guyatt et al. 
2008; Higgins and Green 2006; Woodruff 
et al. 2011) Importantly, although essential 
to addressing bias, systematic and transpar-
ent methods still do not guarantee that the 
influence of industry funding will be elimi-
nated (Rennie 2010; Roseman et al. 2011)
Ultimately, the only legitimate pathway 
to achieve public confidence about chemical 
safety is to institute and sustain a proactive, 
robust regulatory system that is responsive to 
the needs of individuals, workers, and com-
munities whose health is impacted by expo-
sure to chemicals (Landrigan and Goldman 
2011; Vogel and Roberts 2011). Advances 
in chemical policy must be inextricably 
linked to the develop  ment and support for 
independent mechanisms to generate the 
science, systematic and transparent reviews 
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of the evidence, and unceasing regulatory 
and public vigilance about the influence of 
funding source on the science that informs 
environmental health policy. 
Subsequent  to  submitting  this  letter,  the 
University of California, San Francisco, Program 
on Reproductive Health and the Environment 
(T.W. and P.S.) received a grant from the 
Johnson Family Foundation (S.V.) in support of a 
meeting to advance work on developing systema  tic 
and transparent methods to vet the science linking 
the environment and health. The other author 




Program on Reproductive Health and 
the Environment





New York, New York
Lisa A. Bero
Institute of Health Policy Studies
University of California, San Francisco
San Francisco, California
RefeRences
Barnes DE, Bero LA. 1997. Scientific quality of original 
research articles on environmental tobacco smoke. Tob 
Control 6(1):19–26.
Barnes DE, Bero LA. 1998. Why review articles on the health 
effects of passive smoking reach different conclusions. 
JAMA 279(19):1566–1570.
Bero  LA.  1999.  Accepting  commercial  sponsorship. 
Disclosure helps—but is not a panacea [Editorial]. BMJ 
319(7211):653–654.
Bero L, Oostvogel F, Bachetti P, Lee K. 2007. Factors associated 
with findings of published trials of drug–drug comparisons: 
why some statins appear more efficacious than others. 
PLoS Med 4(6):e184; doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040184 
[Online 5 June 2007].
Bipartisan Policy Center. 2009. Improving the Use of Science 
in Regulatory Policy. Washington, DC:Bipartisan Policy 
Center.
Brockway LM, Furcht LT. 2006. Conflicts of interest in bio­
medical research—the FASEB guidelines. FASEB J 
20(14):2435–2438.
Conrad JW Jr, Becker RA. 2011. Enhancing credibility of chemi­
cal safety studies: emerging consensus on key assess­
ment criteria. Environ Health Perspect 119:757–764.
Guyatt GH, Oxman AD, Kunz R, Vist GE, Falck­Ytter Y, 
Schünemann HJ, et al. 2008. What is “quality of evi­
dence” and why is it important to clinicians? BMJ 
336(7651):995–998.
Henry CJ, Conrad JW Jr. 2008. Scientific and legal perspectives 
on science generated for regulatory activities. Environ 
Health Perspect 116:136–141.
Higgins JPT, Green S, eds. 2006. Cochrane Handbook for 
Systematic Reviews of Interventions 4.2.6. The Cochrane 
Library, Issue 4. Chichester, UK:John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
IARC (International Agency for Research on Cancer). 2008. 
IARC Code of Good Scientific Practice. IARC Working 
Group Reports Vol 4. Lyon, France:IARC.
Institute of Medicine. 2009. Conflicts of Interest in Medical 
Research, Education and Practice. Washington, DC:National 
Academies Press.
Landrigan PJ, Goldman LR. 2011. Children’s vulnerability 
to toxic chemicals: a challenge and opportunity to 
strengthen health and environmental policy. Health Aff 
30(5):842–850.
Lexchin J, Bero LA, Djulbegovic B, Clark O. 2003. Pharmaceutical 
industry sponsorship and research outcome and quality: 
systematic review. BMJ 326(7400):1167–1170.
Popelut A, Valet F, Fromentin O, Thomas A, Bouchard P. 2010. 
Relationship between sponsorship and failure rate of den­
tal implants: a systematic approach. PLoS One 5(4):e10274; 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010274 [Online 21 April 2010].
Rennie D. 2010. Integrity in scientific publishing. Health Serv 
Res 45(3):885–896.
Roseman M, Milette K, Bero LA, Coyne JC, Lexchin J, 
Turner EH, et al. 2011. Reporting of conflicts of interest in 
meta­analyses of trials of pharmacological treatments. 
JAMA 305(10):1008–1017.
Rowe S, Alexander N, Clydesdale FM, Applebaum RS, 
Atkinson S, Black RM, et al. 2009. Funding food science 
and nutrition research: financial conflicts and scientific 
integrity. Am J Clin Nutr 89(5):1285–1291.
Shah RV, Albert TJ, Brugel­Sanchez V, Vaccaro AR, 
Hilibrand AS, Grauer JN. 2005. Industry support and cor­
relation to study outcome for papers published in Spine. 
Spine 30(9):1099–1104. 
U.S. Census Bureau. 2009. 2007 Economic Census. Available: 
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/IBQTable?_bm=y&­ds_
name=EC0700CADV1 [accessed 4 November 2011].
Vogel SA, Roberts JA. 2011. Why The Toxic Substances Control 
Act needs an overhaul, and how to strengthen oversight of 
chemicals in the interim. Health Aff 30(5):898–905.
Woodruff TJ, Sutton P, The Navigation Guide Work Group. 2011. 
An evidence­based medicine methodology to bridge the 
gap between clinical and environmental health sciences. 
Health Aff 30(5):931–937.
Enhancing Credibility of Chemical 
Safety Studies: No Consensus
http://dx.doi.org/10.1289/ehp.1104130
I commend Conrad and Becker (2011) for 
frankly discussing the criteria by which to 
judge data quality in chemical risk assess-
ment. Those criteria revolve tightly around 
financial conflict of interests. I agree with 
Conrad and Becker (2011) that indus-
try seems likely to continue to perform the 
toxicity tests in risk assessment. That is due 
to what I call the “GLP [Good Laboratory 
Practices] shield.” Industry’s compliance with 
GLP has caused many tens of thousands of 
published independent chronic toxicity stud-
ies—any of which might have determined the 
allowable “safe” daily dose of a chemical—to 
be excluded from pre  market approval risk 
assessments and substituted with financially 
conflicted, yet GLP-compliant, data from the 
chemical’s manufacturer. 
It is incomprehensible to me that Conrad 
and Becker (2011) assert that a financial con-
flict of interests should not be a criterion in 
determining the financial independence of 
researchers (and therefore the reliability of 
results). A financial conflict of interests exists 
as soon as there is a link between a researcher 
and a monetary value. It does not signify 
unethical behavior, but it does warn of that 
possibility. Scientists should be reassured—
not upset, as Conrad and Becker (2011) 
claim—if financial conflict of interests was the 
lead criteria to assess data quality. Conrad and 
Becker’s substitute criterion—disclosure of 
financial conflict of interests—becomes useless 
with their other recom  mendation to accept 
the data of financially conflicted scientists.
Conrad and Becker (2011) failed to 
mention the independent and consistent 
reviews that all but prove that sponsor  ship 
of science by the pharmaceutical industry 
produces results more financially favorable to 
them than those of financially independent 
science, and several reviews of toxicity studies 
of petrochemicals reach the same conclusion 
(Bekelman et al. 2003; Fagin et al. 1999; 
Swaen and Meijers 1988; vom Saal and 
Hughes 2005). 
Repeatedly Conrad and Becker (2011) 
urge regulators to accept GLP as a key cri-
terion determining data reliability (the 
ability to predict actual toxicities). The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) creates toxicity study 
guidelines (OECD 2011) featuring GLP, 
which are adopted worldwide by regulators. 
These OECD regulatory test protocols are 
stuck in the age of the light microscope, test 
a narrow and unrealistic portion of the dose–
response curve and relatively few end points, 
mostly fail to test toxicity during vulnera-
ble develop  ment, and kill the animals being 
tested before most diseases develop (a human 
equivalent of ~ 60 years). Society should not 
accept that the OECD GLP protocols are 
better than those developed by independent, 
curious academics. Therefore, for any com-
mon petro  chemical, readers should compare 
in depth the independent toxicity findings 
via PubMed and the OECD GLP alleged 
safe exposure level, which Conrad and Becker 
(2011) promote. 
Conrad and Becker (2011) proposed that 
industry be allowed to continue to influ-
ence research, although they would discount 
studies for which a sponsor owns the results. 
Journals seem to prefer the simplicity and 
finality of forbidding outsider control of a 
researcher’s data.
Finally, Conrad and Becker (2011) 
(compared with Becker et al. 2009) gave 
lukewarm support to traditional journal peer 
review and publication, but they continue to 
question its value, claiming instead that peer 
review by government regulatory agencies is 
of better quality. However, such a criterion 
would simply reinforce these agencies’ cur-
rent use of these financially conflicted data 
in determining risk assessment outcome. It 
would be better if risk assessment relied on 
traditional peer review, which is science’s 
most fundamental tool for ensuring reliable 
data. False-negative error is more consequen-
tial than false-positive error.
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